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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
KEITH D. BULLOCK,

Appellant,
vs.
DESERET DODGE TRUCK CENTER,
INC., a corporation,
Respondent.

Case No.
9193

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered
in favor of respondent who was the defendant below.
Prior to his employment with the respondent, appellant
was employed with Chrysler Corporation in the sale and
distribution of Dodge Trucks, stationed at Dallas, Texas..
After attending a meeting in Detroit where a truck
center program was outlined, appellant wrote John S.
Hinckley a letter concerning the desirability of preparing
to obtain a truck center for Salt Lake City (R. 39, 41).
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When Hinckley's Inc. made application for a truck
center franchise, the application was sent to appellant at
Dallas, Texas, for his opinion (R. 41). Appellant reported
favorably on the Hinckley application, and by personal
effort and interest gave assurance to the representatives
of Dodge Truck Division that Hinckley's, Inc. could handle
the truck center (R. 41).
Appellant traveled to Salt Lake City on at least three
separate occasions to discuss the organization of the truck
center and to work out an agreement for his employment
as manager of the truck center (R. 39).
On the representation of Hinckley's, Inc. that adequate
management would be obtained, they were granted the truck
center franchise (R. 42). A new corporation was formed,
and titled Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., the respondent
herein. Appellant wrote the original stock orders for the
truck center in a hotel room in Detroit (R. 42).
Hinckley's, Inc. and Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
represented to appellant that the oral agreements between
the parties would be put into writing in accordance with
appellant's request (R. 40). The first draft of the employment Agreement was rejected by appellant because it failed
to provide for all of the stock options and rights which had
been discussed. The subsequent draft was presented at the
first directors' meeting in January, 1958, and all the parties
signed.
Appellant resigned his position with Chrysler Corporation upon the· representation that he would be a participating owner by virtue of stock options in a business which he
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particularly wanted to be in, and that he would have a
management position in that business for at least an eight
year period (R. 40). He moved his family from Dallas,
Texas, and took a cut in annual salary.
The success of the business depended almost entirely
upon appellant's management skills and abilities (R. 3).
A wholesale truck business was launched, dealers were
cultivated, contacts were made, financing and bookkeeping
procedures were set up, all under the management and
direction of the appellant. Having established a going and
successful wholesale truck business, appellant was suddenly
approached by an officer of the respondent corporation,
who was also an officer of Hinckley's, Inc. and told that he
would henceforth be working for Hinckley's, Inc. selling
trucks retail. No stock option was offered and appellant
was to lose his management position with the respondent
corporation (R. 39). Appellant then had the choice of being
eased out of the company he helped organize or relying upon
the Agreement to maintain his position in the respondent
corporation. Appellant refused to be transferred and was
immediately dismissed by respondent's president (R. 40).
Appellant filed suit alleging an employment Agreement
for a period of not less than eight years. Appellant's deposition was taken (R. 20) and appellant then made a motion
pursuant to the discovery procedures under Rule 34, U. R.
C. P. The Court refused to grant appellant's motion and
offered to entertain a Motion for Summary Judgment, and
respondent amended its answer to plead the Statute of
Frauds, 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS PORTIONS OF
A CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED AGAINST T'HE PARTY PROVIDING THE AGREEMENT.
POINT II.
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED
FROM PLEADING AND RELYING UPON THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
POINT III.
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL THE
AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
OFFERED BY THE RESPONDENT OR ITS
AFFILIATES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS PORTIONS OF
A CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
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CONSTRUED AGAINST THE PARTY PROVIDING THE AGREEMENT.
The Agreement here sued upon attached to the Appellant's complaint was drafted by respondent's attorneys. It
was redrafted on at least one occasion made necessary by
the fact that the original Agreement did not give appellant
the right to purchase stock which Hinckley's., Inc. may offer
for sale. The language of the Agreement and all of the implications arising therefrom should be construed most
strongly against the defendant, especially in view of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement.
Huber & Roland Construction Company v. City of South
Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P. 2d 258 (1958); Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.
2d 773 (1957).
Additionally, all of the facts and surrounding circumstances in the pleadings and deposition upon which this case
was submitted at the Motion for Summary Judgment, must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant. In
re Williams' Estates, ... Utah ... , 348 P. 2d 683 (1960).

POINT II.
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED
FROM PLEADING AND RELYING UPON THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The complaint alleges appellant was hired by respondent for a period of not less than eight years, at an annual
salary of $10,200.00 per year, but the Agreement relied upon
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by appellant does not expressly state these terms. At 3
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 684, p. 685, it is said:
"There is much litigation in service contracts
over the length of the term of employment. This is
due to the fact that employment contracts, even when
by correspondence, are usually very informal, with
brevity in wording, and much uncertainty in meaning. Neither party may have any definite period of
service in mind; in which case it is natural for them
to say nothing about it, and the employment is terminable at the will of either party. On the other hand,
both of them may understand that the hiring is for
a definite period. The circumstances may be evidential of such an understanding, even though the express words standing alone would not bear such an
interpretation. Thirdly, one of the parties (usually
the employee) may have had in mind a definite period of employment and the other party had not.
Here there is no actual 'meeting of the minds'; and
yet there may be a valid contract. Interpreting the
elliptical expressions of the parties, the court may
find that the expressions, interpreted in the light of
the surrounding facts, made the understanding of
one of the parties reasonable and made it unreasonable for the other party not to know that such would
be the first party's understanding. In such a case,
there is a contract in accordance with that understanding. The second party, having negligently or
intentionally misled the first, is bound by estoppel."
And at page 687 it is said :
"If the circumstances are such that a termination of the relation by one party will result in great
hardship or loss to the other, as they must have
known it would when they made the contract, this
is a factor of great weight in inducing a holding that
the parties agreed upon a specific period. The avoid-
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ance of such hardship is not the sole reason that
influences the court; such proof indicates the kind
of agreement that the parties probably would have
made. This is illustrated by cases in which the employee is caused to give up another good position or
to incur difficulty and expense in moving to a new
location."
A landmark case and one· which parallels the case at
bar very closely is Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P.
88 (1909). In that case plaintiff gave up a permanent position with the detective force of the County and City of San
Francisco to accept employm.ent offered by one Charles. L.
Fair for a period of ten years. The oral Agreement was, to
be put in writing as soon as Fair returned from a European
trip. He was killed in Europe and did not return and the
oral Agreement was never put into writing, and after a
period of approximately two years, the heirs discharged the
plaintiff. The Statute of Frauds was. raised as a defense
and was met head-on by the doctrine of equitable estoppel
in what has proved to be a landmark opinion. The court
stated at 106 P. 94:
"The presence of fraud is, of course, essential.
It is established by a multitude of cases that to constitute fraud sufficient to serve as the foundation for
estoppel by acts or conduct an actual intent to mislead is not essential. Mr. Pomeroy in his work on
Specific Performance says that the fraud essential
in such cases is not necessarily an antecedent fraud,
consciously intended by a party in making the contract, but a fraud inhering in the consequence of
thus setting up the statute."
Respondent cites Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 281
P. 2d 730, to the effect that all of the essential elements of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
a contract or agreement must be set out in the memorandum
to avoid the operation of the statute, but also, in that case
the court was explicit in stating that equitable estoppel
might have been applicable had it been properly raised and
presented.
In this case, appellant filed affidavits (R. 39, 41) which
presented facts sufficient to show a drastic change of position on the part of the appellant in reliance upon this
Agreement, and authorities were quoted affirming the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel where such
facts exist (R. 27, 33 and 52).
At 2 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d, Sec. 442, it
is said:
"Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by
principal and agent to employ and to serve create
obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by either party.
"(a) Promises by a principal to employ and by
an agent to serve are interpreted as promises to employ and to serve at the agreed rate, only so long as
either party wishes, if no time is specified and no
consideration for entering into the relation is given
other than the promise in general terms to employ
or serve, in the absence of manifestations indicating
otherwise. The specific terms of the Agreement, the
fact that the consideration has been given for entering into this relation distinct from the promise to
pay for the service, or the circumstances surrounding the en1ployment may, however, indicate that the
parties have contracted with reference to a period
of time during which the employment is to continue.

* * *

"(c) If the principal receives for his promise
to employ the agent, consideration other than a mere
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promise to serve, and no time is specified by the
terms of the agreement, the principal's promise is
interpreted as a promise to employ the agent for a
time which is reasonable in view of the purposes of
the party giving the consideration."
Respondent has launched a two-pronged attack upon
the Agreement alleging that the period of employment is
an essential element not expressly stated and secondly, that
it is not an employment contract at all, but merely a stock
option, and that the reference to employment is incidental.
The foregoing quotations from authorities indicate that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been applied as to
the first point of the attack.
As to the second point, if respondent's assumption is
correct, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the
pleading of the Statute of Frauds. They are simply stating
that there was no written memorandum of the Agreement,
and that therefore, the Agreement alleged is a parol Agreement, subject to the Statute of F'rauds. In Ravarino v. Price,
123 Utah 559, 260 P. 2d 570 (1953), this Court after reviewing the language of Seymour v. Oelrichs, stated at 260
P. 2d 576:
"The binding thread which runs through these
cases distinguishing them from the general rule that
a mere promise as to future conduct will not work
an estoppel, is that the promise designedly made to
influence the conduct of the promisee, tacitly encouraging the conduct, and although the conduct of the
promisee constitutes no actual performance of the
oral contract itself, it is something that 'must be
done by plaintiff before he can begin to perform as
was shown to the defendants.' Kraft v. Rooke, 103
Cal. App. 552, 284 P. 935, 937."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Respondent's officers and agents knew that appellant
would have to terminate his employment with Chrysler Corporation and move from Dallas, Texas, to Salt Lake City,
Utah, in order to accept the management position respondent offered to him.
Appellant had no intention of terminating his employment with Chrysler Corporation until he was offered an
employment contract, or until respondent represented to
him that a contract for employment would be forthcoming
(R. 39, 42). In this respect the facts are similar to those
of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stevenson, 217 F. 2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1954). In that case it was held that where an oral employment agreement provided that within six weeks to three
months after employment began the employer would work
out a long range agreement in writing, and the employee
moved his, family from California to Alaska and relinquished
his rights with his former employer, employee's right to
recover was not barred by the Alaska Statute of Frauds.
After examining RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Sec.
90, the Court states at page 297:
"The foregoing section, not mentioning promissory estoppel, is addressed not to the Statute of
Frauds, but to promissory estoppel as a substitute
for consideration. However, when one considers the
part Samuel Williston took in the formulation of
the Restatement of Contracts, and then examines
section 178, comment F., one must conclude that
there was an intention to carry promissory estoppel (or call it what you will) into the Statute of
Frauds if the additional factor of a promise to reduce the contract to writing is present * * *
The circumstance of Stevenson's relinquishing his
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rights with Western, the promise to make a written
contract on the future condition, we· think, meets
the test of the restatement."
In concluding the matter, the Court states that the rule
set down in Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88, is
generally followed throughout the country. See also Fibreboard Products, Inc. v. To~vnsend, 202 F. 2d 180 (9th Cir.
1953 reh. den.) .
That appellant was led to rely upon the Agreement as
representing an employment Agreement is evident from
the record (R. 40) and the respondent has produced no evidence to show the contrary. In the case of Easton v. Wycoff,
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 332 (1956) this Court quoted with
approval from RESTATEME.NT OF CONTRACTS, Sec.
178 (Comment F):
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the
statute, an estoppel may preclude objection on that
ground in the same way that objection to the nonexistence of other facts essential for the establishment. of a right or a defense may be precluded. A
misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on the
representation precludes proof by the party who
made the representation that it was false and a
promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied
upon, may give rise to an effective promissory estoppel if the statute would otherwise operate to defraud."
The general rules applicable to oral contracts where
the Statute of Frauds is set up as a defense are outlined at
49 AM. JUR. STATUTE OF FRAUDS Sec. 579-583. In as-
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serting that the Agreement is simply a stock option and
that the reference to employment is entirely incidental (R.
49), respondent is impaled upon the language of 49 AM.
JUR. Sec. 580, the second paragraph of page 887, as follows.:

"* * * The fraud against which the Courts
grant relief, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds,
consists in a refusal to perform an agreement upon
the faith of which the plaintiff has been misled to
his injury or made some irretrievwble change of position, especially where the defendant has secured
an unconscionable advantage, and not in the mere
moral wrong involved in the refusal to perform a
contract which by reason of the statute cannot be
enforced. When one party induces another on the
faith of a parol contract to place himself in a worse
situation than he could have been if no agreement
existed, and especially if the former derives. a benefit therefrom at the expense of the latter, and avails
himself of his legal advantage, he is guilty of a fraud,
and uses the statute for a purpose not intendedthe injury of another-for his own profit. In such
cases equity regards the case as being removed' from
the Statute of Frauds."
POINT III.
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL THE
AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Appellant's deposition shows that the signatures were
not affixed to the Agreement until the end of the directors'
meeting at which the Agreement was signed (Appellant's
deposition page 22, line 12). Appellant's annual salary was
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agreed upon at that same directors' meeting and could not
have been included in the Agreement when it was prepared.
By the use of discovery procedures provided by our
Utah Rules, appellant attempted to obtain photostats or
make copies of respondent's minute·s (R. 12). For some
unaccountable reason this discovery procedure was not allowed by the Court and appellant was subjected to the outcome of the Motion for Summary Judgment. This is exactly
opposite to the spirit and intent of Rule 56 U. R. C. P. Had
appellant been allowed to copy respondent's minutes for
that first directors' meeting, respondent's objection that
the Agreement nowhere provides. for a stated salary may
have been abortive.
Of somewhat more concern to the· respondent is the
fact that the Agreement nowhere expressly provides for an
employment period. By the terms of the Agreement appellant was given two separate and distinct stock options. The
third clause provides that appellant shall have the opportunity to purchase stock at stated periods up to and including January, 1966. Should the appellant exercise this option, he would purchase stock from the respondent corporation. In the sixth clause of the Agreement, appellant is
given the privilege of purchasing stock from a completely
different corporation which by the terms of the Agreement
is the majority stockholder, namely, Hinckley's, Inc. As
set out in the Agreement, these options are separate and
independent. Appellant claims no special significance to
the fact that the first option as set forth in the third clause
is dependent upon appellant's continued employment with
respondent corporation. This provision, in fact, is essential

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
to avoid controversy which may arise later and to show
adequate consideration for the stock option plan. Kerbs v.
California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 D. Ch. 69, 90 A. 2d
652 (1952). However, the fact that this option ran for an
eight year period is significant because respondent chose
the length of time that the option was to run and led appellant to believe that his employment was assured for that
length of time.
By the terms of the second option contained in the sixth
clause, appellant has the right to purchase from Hinckley's,
Inc. regardless of his employment with the respondent company. As Hinckley's, Inc. is a separate legal entity and the
majority stockholder, appellant is not obligated to remain
employed to avail himself of this option. Yet the parties
contemplated that in 1966 appellant would still be employed
with respondent corporation (R. 35). There is no language
indicating it, and there is no necessity for it in terms of
consideration, yet respondent admits that the contemplation
was that appellant would then be employed to avail himself of that option. This interpretation is absolutely
untenable. Suppose, for example, appellant had worked
three or four years., and had purchased stock pursuant to
the option contained in the third clause, and had then been
terminated by respondent. As a minority stockholder, he
would certainly have an interest in exercising any option
to purchase stock in the corporation he helped organize and
set up, and this interest has nothing to do with his being
employed with the respondent corporation, but is simply
a matter of further investment and control of the corporation.
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The case of Magness v. Madden, 212 Ark. 646, 207 S.
W. 2d 714 (1948), involves similar issues. There plaintiff
was employed by defendant as manager of a milling company at a stated salary, plus 30% of net profits, and an
option to buy one-third of the business on or before five
years. At the end of four months, plaintiff was discharged
by defendant under the view that it was a month to month
employment as set forth in the salary arrangement. Plaintiff claimed his employment was. for five years as set forth
in the option clause. Defendant raised the Statute of Frauds
as a defense. A trial court allowed extrinsic testimony to
show the intention of the parties because of the uncertainty
of the duration of employment, and sent the issue to the
jury. A verdict for plaintiff resulted, and in affirming the
trial court, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said:
"While appellant argues that the following
clause in the contract was an option to appellee to
purchase at any time within the five year period we
think that the jury might have found as they evidently did that this clause furnished a clue to the real
intention of the parties which was that the contract
should continue for a five year term."
The authorities are nicely summarized at 4 WILLISTON Sec. 1027 A (3) 1936 Ed.:
"It is the settled law of agency that if the agent
or employee furnishes a consideration in addition
to his mere services, he is. deemed to have purchased
the employment for at least a reasonable time where
the duration of the employment is. not otherwise defined."

Respondent supplied the contract and set out the eight
year option and by their actions and representations, led
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appellant to rely on that eight year period. A jury would
have a perfect right to also rely on the eight year period
as the length of the employment.
Respondent interprets the Madden case as giving an
unequivocal option to an employee to buy a one-third interest in a business within five years, from which it could
be implied that he was to be employed at least for the duration of the option. The present case is distinguished on the
point that appellant could only exercise the option during
the time that he was employed. Respondent fails to distinguish the fact that the Madden case dealt with a partnership and not with a corporate structure as in this case
(R. 49). Respondent apparently had an opposite view
when the Motion for Summary Judgment was called on for
hearing (R. 35).
The seventh clause of the Agreement provides that
respondent shall employ appellant Keith D. Bullock as its
general manager. While there is no express language stating the period of employment, appellant earnestly contends
that in the light of the entire Agreement and the circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement, the employment period is not less than eight years. Granted, there
is an ambiguity, but that ambiguity is resolved by the language of the Agreement, and the intention expressed in the
recitals. But assuming the ambiguity survives the four
corners test, the appellant should still have the opportunity
of producing extrinsic evidence as to surrounding circumstances, and the actions and intentions of the parties as
expressed prior to the commencement of this action. In
Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d
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98, 306 P. 2d 773 (1957), this Court stated at 6 Utah 2d
101:
"If the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic
evidence should not be allowed. * * * If the
instrument on its face, remains ambiguous in spite
of the reasonable construction, the intent may be
ascertained in the light of all written instruments
which were a part of the same transaction. * * *
If the intent is ambiguous still, then parol evidence
may be admitted, * * * and rules of construction may be invoked to declare· the intention of the
parties."
See also In re Williams' Estates, ... Utah ... , 348 P. 2d
683 (1960).
A significant clue as to the intent of the parties with
respect to the Agreement and the permanency of appellant's
employment is the fact that appellant was both a director
and a vice president in respondent corporation, and was
listed as one of the incorporators. While these facts stand~.
ing alone are not significant, taken in the light of all the
other surrounding circumstances, the conclusion forced
upon the mind is that both parties and especially the appellant considered this employment to be for at least an eight
year period.
The seventh clause is not in that Agreement just incidentally as respondent suggests. A stock option Agreement
could have been written absent that seventh clause, and
achieved all of the purposes respondent claims for this
Agreement. The seventh clause ought not to be ignored as
an incidental appendage to this Agreement, but ought to
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be given full meaning in accordance with the purposes and
intent of the parties as evidenced by the surrounding circumstances.

The fact that respondent's president did not dare terminate appellant or remove him from the position guaranteed
by the Agreement without first offering other employment
within his power, is indicative of the fact that prior to the
commencement of this action respondent understood and interpreted the Agreement in a much different light. Otherwise, appellant would have been terminated without any
other offer of employment.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
OFFERED BY THE RESPONDENT OR ITS
AFFILIATES.
Prior to the 13th day of January, 1959, appellant and
respondent's president, John S. Hinckley, had some differences of opinion with regard to the management of respondent corporation. On the 13th day of January, 1959, appellant was told that he would either sell trucks retail for
Hinckley's, Inc., or he would he terminated by respondent
corporation (R. 40). This choice has the same potentialities as that expressed by the old mountain man when he
said he didn't know whether he would rather be bit by a
cotton mouth or a diamond-back rattler. Should appellant
choose to be employed with Hinckley's, Inc. respondent
would be safe in assuming that appellant had voluntarily
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abandoned his rights under the Agreement. Appellant chose
the alternative and his employment was terminated and he
was then forced to test his rights under the Agreement.
Thus having put appellant between a rock and a hard place·,
respondent now contends that appellant was obligated to
choose the other alternative to mitigate any damages he
might have suffered at the hands of the respondent (R. 36,
37).
Appellant was not hired to sell trucks retail for Hinckley's, Inc. He was hired by the terms of the Agreement to
manage the respondent corporation. The respondent corporation is the legitimate though somewhat errant offspring
of Hinckley's, Inc. and while the two are separate legal
entities, they are one in interest. Appellant, having been
terminated by respondent corporation, was not obligated to
accept employment with Hinckley's. Inc. no matte·r how
attractive· the offer, if it was not the job he was hired to
perform. And additionally, appellant was not obligated to
accept the employment offered when it involved a sacrifice
of his rights under the Agreement here sued upon, and. the
taking on of a position of lesser importance and no comparable benefits. At 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec.
683, page 684 and 685 it is said :
"Likewise, in commercial employment an employee may have been promised a place of dignity
and privilege, so that it is. a breach of contract, and
an essential one, to reduce him to an inferior status.
One who has ·been hired to be superintendent or general sales manager would generally be justified in
quitting if he is ordered to act as floor walker or
sales clerk, even though his salary is not reduced:.
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Such an order would also frequently be held to be a
wrongful discharge by the employer.
"Of course, the refusal of an employee to perform a service or to accept a compensation different
from that required by his. promise, even though demanded by his employer in the belief that it is so
required, is not wrongful and does not justify discharge. It all depends upon reasonable interpretation of the Agreement, often a difficult matter."
Appellant did not want to sell trucks retail for Hinckley's, Inc. That type of employment had been offered to appellant previously and he had refused it (R. 41).
At 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 1043, page 232,
it is said:
"One is not required to mitigate his losses by
accepting an arrangement with the repudiator if
that is made conditional on his surrender of his
rights under the repudiated contract. He is not required to do that which will operate as a rescission,
compromise, or an accord and satisfaction. He may
in some cases he able to enter into the new arrangement while at the same time expressly reserving his
rights under the first contract; but he certainly is
not required to do this if the new proposal is so made
that an acceptance may possibly he held to operate
in discharge of his former rights.
"An employee who has been wrongfully discharged is not required to accept an offer of re-employment by the· repudiator if the circumstances are
such that returning to the same employ will involve humiliation or undesirable personal relations.
Whether the degree of discomfort involved in such
re-employment would be unreasonable is a jury qu~
tion; in most cases the repudiating employer would
be unable to sustain such a defense."
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CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that a contract or agreement shall be
construed most strongly against the party who provided the
document.
All of the authorities hold that the doctrine of estoppel
shall prevent an unconscionable use of the Statute of Frauds
where the following elements are present:
a. Where a party has given consideration in addition to that promised in the Agreement, such as the
giving up of other employment and removal to another
city.
b. Where the employee in reliance upon the
Agreement has suffered great loss and irretrievably
changed his position.
c. Where there has. been the promise of a written
Agreement to protect the employee's rights.
Most of the cases require only the first two. Some of
the closer cases require all three. Pruitt v. Fontana, 143
Cal. App. 2d 675, 300 P. 2d 371, 379 (1956); Moore v. Day,
123 Cal. App. 2d 134, 266 P. 2d 51 (1954); Le Blonde v.
Wolfe, 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P. 2d 278 (1948). The facts
in the case at bar contain all three situations, and equitable
estoppel should be a bar to the pleading of the Statute of
Frauds in this case.
The Agreement as a whole, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, is not even subject to the Statute of Frauds,
and the period of employment should be a jury question. All
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of the authorities so hold and cases applying this rule have
been cited. Appellant should have the right to cross examine respondent's officers' to ascertain their interpreta,.
tion of the Agre·ement prior to the commencement of this
action.
Finally, the appellant was not obligated to accept any
other employment offered by respondent corporation or by
Hinckley's, Inc.
For these reasons the judgment should be reversed) and
the case remanded for trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,

BEAN AND BEAN,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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